Hi! My question is very simple.
I want to be almost 100% sure that if something gains admin access (by an exploit for instance) to DSM (which device I call "Synology A") then the backups I created with "Synology A" with ABB cannot be deleted by the something by simply just having access to "Synology A". Cloud solutions are not an option.
I am aware of Snapshot Replication and Hyper Backup solutions to get the backups to another extra place, but normally an admin at "Synology A" can delete these extra repos any time if I understand well. And if we think of Snapshot Replication to another Synology device (Synology B), the exploit can be on "Synology A" and "Synology B" also by-the-way...
Getting the backup data to another non-Synology device (non-Synology device) with Hyper Backup or other manual methods and making the backup read-only or inaccessible there is a better solution, because the risks of both devices ("Synology A" and "non-Synology device") being compromised is minimal (if of course all credentials are different etc). I can even automate the process probably on the "non-Synology device" (move the data somewhere else or just make it read-only after the task is finished). Of course I am not thinking about the situation where both "Synology A" and "non-Synology device" are exploitable, that would be too much
What is the best method for this to make sure that no ransomware and also no Synology exploit can make data disappear? I want to sleep a bit better
Thanks,
Daniel
I want to be almost 100% sure that if something gains admin access (by an exploit for instance) to DSM (which device I call "Synology A") then the backups I created with "Synology A" with ABB cannot be deleted by the something by simply just having access to "Synology A". Cloud solutions are not an option.
I am aware of Snapshot Replication and Hyper Backup solutions to get the backups to another extra place, but normally an admin at "Synology A" can delete these extra repos any time if I understand well. And if we think of Snapshot Replication to another Synology device (Synology B), the exploit can be on "Synology A" and "Synology B" also by-the-way...
Getting the backup data to another non-Synology device (non-Synology device) with Hyper Backup or other manual methods and making the backup read-only or inaccessible there is a better solution, because the risks of both devices ("Synology A" and "non-Synology device") being compromised is minimal (if of course all credentials are different etc). I can even automate the process probably on the "non-Synology device" (move the data somewhere else or just make it read-only after the task is finished). Of course I am not thinking about the situation where both "Synology A" and "non-Synology device" are exploitable, that would be too much
What is the best method for this to make sure that no ransomware and also no Synology exploit can make data disappear? I want to sleep a bit better
Thanks,
Daniel